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1964] RECENT DECISIONS 913 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX-DEFINmoN OF COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATION 
-In 1948 petitioner and several other taxpayers, who had previously been 
active in constructing homes, formed two corporations to build apar~ent 
houses.1 As a result of decreases in the price of building materials and 
savings on labor and architectural costs, each corporation was left, after 
completion of construction, with borrowed funds which exceeded costs of 
construction.2 In the year following completion of construction the tax-
payers distributed the excess borrowed funds of the two corporations and 
then sold their stock in each at a substantial profit. Petitioner reported, 
his receipts from the distribution of the loan funds and the profit on the 
sale of his stock as long term capital gain. The Tax Court,3 one judge dis-
senting, upheld the Commissioner's assertion that these were collapsible 
corporations under section 117(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939' 
1 The project was financed under § 608 of the National Housing Act, 56 Stat. 301 
(1942), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1743(b) (1958), and the Federal Housing Administration 
guaranteed mortgage loans to the two corporations. 
2 Instead of contracting out the carpentry and plumbing work, the taxpayers had 
their own men do the work, saving $85,000 on plumbing and heating. A decline in the 
cost of lumber resulted in a saving of $50,000. In addition, other savings amounted to 
$90,000 in title and recording expenses and legal organizational expenses, and petitioner 
acted as architect for the project, thus saving nearly $600,000 more. Consequently, the 
mortgage loan proceeds exceeded cash expenditures by more than $150,000. Braunstein 
v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir. 1962). 
s Benjamin Braunstein, 36 T.C. 22 (1961). The issue confronting the circuit court 
and the Supreme Court was not raised during the hearing of the case by the Tax Court. 
An explanation for this may be that the Tax Court decision was handed down prior 
to the decision in United States v. Ivey, 294 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1961). 
, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(m) (now substantially INT. REv. Co»E OF 1954, § 341): 
"(l) Treatment of gain to shareholders. Gain from the sale or exchange (whether in 
liquidation or otherwise) of stock of a collapsible corporation, to the extent that it 
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and that taxpayer's gains were therefore ordinary income. On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's opinion, 
holding that section 117(m) applies to the collapse of a corporation regard-
less of whether a shareholder might have received capital gains treatment 
on his receipts if he were doing business as an individual proprietorship. 
On certiorari, held, affirmed, one Justice dissenting. Congress, in enacting 
section 117(m), intended to define what it believed to be a tax avoidance 
device rather than leave the question of the presence of tax avoidance to 
the courts to be determined on the facts of each case; thus the provision 
applies to all corporations falling within its definition, regardless of what 
tax consequences might have resulted had another form of enterprise been 
used. Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65 (1963). 
In 1950 Congress singled out the so-called "collapsible corporation" as 
a tax avoidance device.5 This scheme, originally used primarily by movie 
producers6 and real estate builders,7 involved forming a corporation to 
construct or produce a single property. Typically, the corporation's capital 
structure was highly levered,8 and the shareholders contributed significant 
personal services to the production of the property in return for nominal 
compensation.9 Consequently, production costs were often less than the 
loan funds obtained to finance the enterprise. Upon completion of produc-
tion the shareholders distributed the excess loan funds and liquidated the 
would be considered (but for the provisions of this subsection) as gain from the sale or 
exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months, shall, except as provided in 
paragraph (3), be considered as gain from the sale or exchange of property which is not 
a capital asset. 
"(2) Definitions.-
"(A) For the purposes of this subsection, the term 'collapsible corporation' means a 
corporation formed or availed of principally for the manufacture, construction, or pro-
duction of property, •.. or for the holding of stock in a corporation so formed or availed 
of, with a view to-
"(i) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders (whether in liquidation or 
otherwise), or a distribution to its shareholders, prior to the realization by the corpora-
tion· manufacturing, constructing, producing or purchasing the property of a substantial 
part of the net income to be derived from such property, and 
"(ii) the realization by such shareholders of gain attributable to such property .••• 
"(3) Limitations on application of subsection.-In the case of gain realized by a 
shareholder upon his stock in a collapsible corporation- • . • 
"(C) this subsection shall not apply to gain realized after the expiration of three 
years follo~ing the completion of such manufacture, construction, production, or pur-
chase .•.. 
5 See H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1950); S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 
2d Sess. 88 (1950). See also H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1951); S. REP. No. 
781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1951). 
6 E.g., Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376 (1955); Fred MacMurray, 21 T.C. 15 (1953). 
7 S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1950); see Note, Legislative Response to 
the Collapsible Corporation, 51 CoLUM. L. REv. 361, 363 &: n.15 (1951). 
s A high percentage of the corporate capital structure was in the form of borrowed 
funds. Consequently, the stockholders risked very little capital, while enjoying an oppor-
tunity to realize large gain if the project prospered. In the principal case the total paid-in 
capital of the stockholders was $260 on a project involving $6,000,000 in expenditures. 
9 See note 2 supra; United States v. Ivey, 294 F.2d 799, 804 (5th Cir. 1961); Pat O'Brien, 
25 T.C. 376 (1955). 
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corporation or sold their stock before realizing any substantial income from 
the property. The shareholders therefore paid only a twenty-five percent 
capital gains tax on earnings attributable to personal services and past and 
future corporate income10 which, if the collapsible scheme were not used, 
would have been taxable as ordinary individual11 and corporate income.12 
Although use of the collapsible corporation scheme could conceivably 
have been curtailed by resort to existing provisions of the Code,13 Congress 
chose to enact section 117 (m) to deal specifically with the problem. How-
ever, in at least one important circumstance, the precise application to be 
given this provision was not clearly indicated by Congress. It was not ap-
parent whether Congress intended the provision to be interpreted as apply-
ing only to situations in which the facts involved avoidance, and thus to 
those receipts which would be taxed as ordinary income under another form 
of enterprise, or to be interpreted literally as applying to the receipts result-
ing from the "collapse" of any corporation falling within the provision's 
definition of a "collapsible corporation." The alternative interpretations 
present more than an academic question. In a situation where a partner-
ship is formed to produce a single property and is not deemed a "collapsible 
partnership,"14 to the extent that the partners do not contribute personal 
services15 and the partnership does not sell the product in the "ordinary 
10 The problem of undistributed corporate income being taxed at capital gains rates 
is not peculiar to collapsible corporations, but exists upon the liquidation of all corpora-
tions. See Bittker 8e Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAX L. REY. 
437 (1950). 
11 S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 84, 88 (1950). Section 213 of the committee 
report dealing with collapsible corporations does not explicitly include salaries; however, 
§ 211, dealing with property created through personal effort, states: "The amendments 
made by this section to Section 117 of the Code do not cover the situation in which the 
taxpayer contributes a copyright or similar property created through his personal efforts 
to a newly formed corporation in exchange for its stock and then sells the stock since 
such situation is dealt with in section 213 of the bill.'' Id. at 84. See generally Hewitt 8e 
Randerson, Shareholder's Capital Gain Status No. 341 Defense; C.A.-2 Conflicts with Ivey, 
17 J. TAXATION 194 (1962). 
12 The sale of stock held for more than the requisite six-month period is treated as 
the sale of a capital asset, providing the sale is not in the ordinary course of the stock-
holder's business. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(a)(l)(A) (now INT. REY. CoDE OF 1954, 
§ 1221(1)). Capital gains treatment on complete liquidation stems from the fact that 
liquidations are treated as sales or exchanges of stock. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(c) (now 
substantially INT. REY. CODE OF 1954, § 331); see Comment, Collapsible Corporations: An 
Analysis of the Past, Present, and Proposed Collapsible Concepts, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REY. 
855, 858 (1960). 
1s Various grounds were available to the Commissioner to challenge the transaction 
in the principal case under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, such as a claim that the 
gain represents earned income taxable under § 22(a), that the income is allocable to the 
corporation under §§ 41 and 45, that the entity of the corporation is to be disregarded, 
or that the stock is to be held for sale in the ordinary course of the business. Of course, 
these grounds are available even if § 117(m) does not apply; but courts are less likely to 
construe them in favor of the Commissioner in light of the existence of a special col-
lapsible corporation provision. See MacLean, Collapsible Corporations-The Statute ~nd 
Regulations, 67 HARv. L. REY. 55, 87 (1953). 
H INT. REY. CODE OF 1954, § 751. 
15 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(a)(l)(C), (now INT. REY. CoDE OF 1954, § 1221(3)). 
This provision was passed in 1950 along with the collapsible corporation provision _fpr 
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course of business,"16 sale of the property yields a capital gain. Moreover, 
an individual partner's sale of his interest in the business may also escape 
ordinary income tax rates.17 Thus, under the hypothesis that section 117 (m) 
was intended to apply to all shareholders within its definition regardless of 
the tax consequences had they not formed a corporation, situations may 
arise in which a taxpayer will lose the benefit of capital gains treatment 
solely as a result of adopting the corporate form. 
While the congressional committee reports are vague and do not reveal 
whether the intent of the committees was that section 117(m) be interpreted 
literally or that it be applied only to fact situations involving tax avoidance, 
the hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means indicate that 
the Treasury Department was interested in having Congress draft a bill 
which would clearly define a "collapsible corporation"-thus a provision 
which could be construed literally.18 It would appear that the objective 
of Congress in enacting section 117(m) was to satisfy this request, for it 
drafted a provision much broader in scope than would have been necessary 
to cover only those situations in which the taxpayer chooses the corporate 
form in an effort to convert ordinary income into capital gain, i.e., those 
situations originally thought to constitute tax avoidance. 
In 1958 Congress, cognizant of the difficulties encountered in the ap-
plication of section 117(m), amended the provision by placing four limita-
tions upon it;19 it was explained that the broad wording of the provision 
the purpose of removing property created through personal efforts from the capital 
asset category. See generally DeWind &: Anthoine, Collapsible Corporations, 56 CoLUM, 
L. REv. 475, 519 (1956). 
16 See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(a)(l)(A) (now INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 1221(1)): 
Victory Housing No. 2 v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1953). See also Friend 
v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1952). However, if the partners collectively sell 
all of the assets of the partnership, the sale may be commuted into its fragments and 
ordinary income realized to the extent that the sale price represents the value held for 
sale by the partnership. See Watson v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544 (1953): Williams v. 
McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945). But see Hatch's Estate v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 
26 (9th Cir. 1952). What purports to be a simultaneous sale of the individual interests of 
the partners is not likely to be treated differently for tax purposes. See MacLean, supra 
note 13, at 86. 
17 Swiren v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1950). 
18 Hearings on the Revenue Revision of 1950 Before the House Committee on Ways 
and Means, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 140-41 (1950). Mr. Lynch, speaking for the Treasury 
Department, testified as follows: 
"Mr. Mills: Should the legislation be specific and include definite standards, or should 
it be rather general and permissive of great discretion in the internal-revenue service? 
"Mr. Lynch: We would not like to ask for great discretion. On the other hand, we 
would like to be assured that the legislation does not place in jeopardy the normal liquid-
ation of corporations, corporations which are organized and carried on regularly to con-
duct a business. .•• 
"Mr. Jenkins: What I am coming to: Is the relief you are asking for a change in the 
law, or is it an increase of personnel in order to have -more inspectors so as to prevent the 
evasion? 
"Mr. Lynch: We want the law to define what this is and not to leave it to the dis-
cretion of the Commissioner •••. " 
19 INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 34l(e); see S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, 32 
(1958). 
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had defeated the original intent of Congress, which was to treat the "col-
lapse" as if the shareholders had sold the corporate assets themselves.20 
Thus it would appear that Congress narrowed the scope of section 117 (m), 
now section 341 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, to be more in 
keeping with coverage of those fact situations which originally were thought 
to constitute tax avoidance. 
The circuit courts have divided on the question of whether the original 
provision should be interpreted literally or only with reference to elimina-
tion of avoidance. Although the 1958 amendment was inapplicable,21 the 
Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Ivey,22 relied on the amended provision 
and the Senate subcommittee reports which preceded it, basing its decision 
on a determination of congressional purpose and intent. The court, un-
willing to construe the provision literally, refused to apply it to a situation 
which would have invoked capital gains treatment in the setting of a part-
nership or individual proprietorship. The Second Circuit, however, took 
the position in its decision in the principal case that section 117 (m) must 
be construed literally. 
The Supreme Court's affirmance in the principal case resolves this con-
flict by declaring that, because Congress intended to define what it believed 
to be a tax avoidance device, any corporation covered by a literal inter-
pretation of this definition is considered to be a "collapsible corporation.''23 
Indeed, the Court's decision is in keeping with what seems to have been 
the original objective of Congress. That purpose appears to have been the 
clear definition of a "collapsible corporation," notwithstanding an ex-
pression in the committee reports preceding the 1958 amendment that the 
provision was drafted more broadly than it should have been merely to 
cover those fact situations originally thought to constitute tax avoidance. 
Nevertheless, whatever the objective of Congress may appear to have been, 
it was not clearly expressed at the time section ll7(m) was passed; and it 
would seem that, absent a clear and specific expression of purpose by an 
enacting Congress, the courts should interpret the provision literally. 
However, there may still be an avenue of relief open to a taxpayer who 
finds himself burdened by a "collapsed" corporation, yet not excluded from 
the operation of section 34124 by one of the limitations placed upon its 
application by the 1958 amendment.25 Section 341 requires that the Com-
missioner show a "view" on the part of the shareholders to "collapse" the 
corporation prior to realizing a substantial part of the income which the 
produced property would yield. The courts, in defining the substantiality 
20 Ibid. 
21 Section 341(e), the 1958 amendment, was not applicable in Ivey, since the operative 
facts had taken place before its enactment. The Fifth Circuit noted that its decision 
was not affected by the amendment. 
22 United States v. Ivey, 294 F.2d 799, 801-04 (5th Cir. 1961). 
23 Principal case at 71. 
24 See note 4 supra. 
25 See note 19 supra. The 1958 amendment merely places four quantitative limitations 
upon the application of the provision. 
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of the "view" required, and in determining the time at which it must be 
formed, retain some discretion in applying this provision. In this regard, 
it would seem that two possible arguments are available to a taxpayer. 
First, courts may be persuaded that the provision is inapplicable because 
the intention or "view" to collapse was not substantial. Second, they may 
be persuaded that, although a substantial "view" did develop, it was not 
formed prior to completion of production; therefore it was not the requisite 
"view." 
Although there has been some disagreement among the commentators,26 
the courts have accepted the interpretation that the words "formed or 
availed of principally," refer directly to "the manufacture, construction or 
production of property," and not to the words "with a view to."27 Conse-
quently, the view to "collapse" is not required to be the principal objective 
of the taxpayer. The regulations give "with a view to" the broadest meaning 
possible, requiring only that the action required in the provision be con-
templated as a "recognized possibility.''28 Such an interpretation appears to 
be too broad. It would seem to include all corporations formed by knowl-
edgeable enterprisers who from past experience are aware of the many 
possible occurrences which may give rise to a need to collapse the corpora-
tion. It appears that a fairer construction "would require that the chance 
of taking the action contemplated be regarded as substantial.''29 
In addition to having formed a "view" to "collapse" the corporation, 
the shareholder must have done so within the time period suggested by the 
provision. The courts and commentators have not been able to agree as to 
the definition of the suggested period and have proposed three different 
points in time: when the corporation was formed,80 before completion of 
construction,81 or any time within the three-year holding period.82 Al-
though adopting the first interpretation would effectuate the word "formed," 
it would attach little significance to the words "availed of." As long as the 
construction of the property is incomplete, the opportunity apparently 
exists to channel a portion of the taxpayer's constructive effort through the 
corporate device; thus the corporation may be "availed of" as a tax avoid-
ance scheme. S3 
Adopting the third interpretation would eliminate the need for the 
use of the word "view." Since the "view" may be formed at any point within 
26 See Altman, Collapsible Corporations, 28 TAXES 1013, 1015 (1950); MacLean, supra 
note 13, at 59; Note, 51 C0Lu11r. L. REv. 361, 364 (1951). 
27 Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765, 768 n.2 (4th Cir. 1958); Honaker Drlg., Inc. 
v. Koehler, 190 F. Supp. 287, 292 (D. Kan. 1960); see August v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 
829 (3d Cir. 1959). 
28 Treas. Reg. § l.341-2(a)(2) (1955). 
20 MacLean, supra note 26, at 60. 
so Id. at 61. 
81 Jacobson v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1960). 
32 Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765, 768-69 (4th Cir. 1958); Glickman v. Com-
missioner, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958) (dictum). 
83 See United States v. Ivey, 294 F.2d 799, 806 (5th Cir. 1961). 
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the three-year holding period, including the moment of collapse, in all in-
stances the circumstances leading to collapse will be contemplated when the 
"view" is formed. Since Congress included the word "view" it would seem 
that the courts should give some effect to it. 
Therefore, the logical limit on the reach of the collapsible corporation 
provision is the point at which the construction of the property is completed. 
Such an interpretation gives consideration to the use by Congress of the 
word "view" in the provision, without permitting the taxpayer's construc-
tive efforts to be channeled through the unfinished property. 
However, one possible argument which is no longer available to a tax-
payer is that involved in Honaker Drlg., Inc. v. Koehler.34 The court in 
Honaker, seizing upon the view requirement, determined that the "requisite 
view" is one of tax avoidance and is therefore lacking when capital gains 
treatment is available under another form of enterprise. This rationale is 
analogous to that used in United States v. Ivey, which was rejected by the 
Supreme Court in the principal case. The provision does not require that 
the view of the taxpayer be one of tax avoidance, but merely that it be a 
view to take that action which constitutes a "collapse" of the corporation. 
Consequently, in analyzing the view requirement, there is no longer a need 
to inquire into a taxpayer's tax avoidance motives in using the corporate 
form. He is presumed to be using the corporation for tax avoidance if the 
enterprise falls within the definition of section 341. Thus the rationale of 
Honaker, as well as that of Ivey, is overturned. 
John E. Mogk 
34. 190 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1960). 
